In Henry M. Paulson's first month as Treasury secretary, two deputies flagged Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as significant risks to the economy. He didn't share their level of concern. When he was at Goldman Sachs, he told the aides, the mortgage giants weren't on the list of things that kept him up at night.
Two years later, they're at the top of his list. Mr. Paulson is embroiled in emergency planning on ways to shore up the companies to avert a destabilizing jolt to the U.S. economy and the world's financial system.
Central bankers, Wall Streeters and members of Congress are waiting for what Mr. Paulson might do. He initially said he had no plans to use his authority -- won from Congress in July -- to inject funds into Fannie and Freddie. But he is meeting daily with his domestic finance staff as they hash out how to intervene if necessary. Scenarios range from buying preferred shares in the companies to various structures for lending.
Mr. Paulson is weighing whether to treat both mortgage companies equally, whether to leave management in place, and the effect on common and preferred shareholders, which include many pension funds. Among the concerns he's wrestling with: A large capital injection would essentially amount to a federal takeover of the companies, including responsibility for guaranteeing trillions of dollars worth of home mortgages.
Mr. Paulson didn't come to the Treasury to be an interventionist. He is a Wall Street pragmatist, a former deal maker whose focus isn't on ideology but on practical fixes and getting things done. It's a measure of the depth of the credit crisis that after joining a laissez-faire Republican administration, Mr. Paulson has helped engineer a transformation of the relationship between the federal government and financial markets.
In March, he joined Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in forcing Bear Stearns Cos. into the hands of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Earlier, Mr. Paulson jawboned lenders into freezing interest rates for some stressed home buyers. His Treasury also took greater responsibility for financing student loans, and he has called for sweeping regulatory changes to give the Fed more power to police banks and Wall Street.
Fannie and Freddie are his biggest test. The companies are crucial to the housing market, owning or guaranteeing nearly half of U.S. mortgages outstanding -- some $5.2 trillion -- and buying most of the new ones being made. A federal intervention in these giants would be one of the largest and most complex in history.
Fannie and Freddie have said they exceed their regulatory capital requirements and don't need help from Treasury. While Mr. Paulson has authority to invest or take an equity stake in the firms, the companies would have to agree to either move.
Mr. Paulson's request for this authority in mid-July was meant to calm the financial markets. But some suggest it further exacerbated problems at Fannie and Freddie, by making investors unsure what the Treasury might do and how this would affect their investments. Some say the uncertainty is complicating the companies' already-difficult task of raising capital by selling common or preferred shares, though they continue to be able to fund themselves through the debt markets.
Mr. Paulson's efforts have drawn the ire of some fellow Republicans, including some in the White House. They say federal backstops only encourage the private sector to repeat its mistakes, and they lament the potential cost of bailouts to taxpayers.
'Wall Street has always had a tendency to seek government help when it benefited them,' says Rep. Spencer Bachus, an Alabama Republican. 'The whole philosophy of 'the government doesn't need to be in the markets' seems to change when companies start losing money.'
Mr. Paulson says he sought authority to aid Fannie and Freddie to stabilize markets, 'not because of wanting any favors for anyone on Wall Street.' He adds: 'This was not an easy thing to do emotionally. It's not something I came to Washington wanting to do.'
Mr. Paulson, 62, arrived in July 2006 eager to tackle issues like Social Security, finishing global trade talks and pressing China to modify certain economic policies. He had spent 32 years on Wall Street, most recently as chief executive of Goldman Sachs Group Inc., where he was known as an aggressive deal maker. With a fortune estimated at $500 million, Mr. Paulson isn't ostentatious or even especially polished. He can stammer at times, or absent-mindedly rub his belly or head while talking.
His style is to dive into data and details. Just hours after issuing marching orders, he may phone to check on progress. In the Bush administration, his aggressive approach quickly earned him a reputation and a nickname, 'Hurricane Hank.'
But he wanted no part of a long-running argument over Fannie and Freddie. Critics said they were too big, posing a risk to the economy if they failed, and unfairly got to raise money cheaply because of an implied federal guarantee. Administration hard-liners wanted to shrink the pair and toughen regulation, such as by making them raise their relatively low ratios of capital to liabilities. But many in Congress, beneficiaries of the companies' lavish campaign giving, favored a softer approach.
Mr. Paulson wasn't happy to be dragged into what he called this 'holy war.' In September 2006, an assistant Treasury secretary told reporters the department was considering ways to rein in Fannie and Freddie if Congress didn't. Massachusetts Rep. Barney Frank called to blast Mr. Paulson, saying the statement jeopardized progress Congress had made on the issue.
Mr. Paulson ordered his deputies into his office and began furiously stamping on a marble coffee table, according to several people who were in the room. He yelled that he needed to establish a good relationship with Mr. Frank, then ranking Democrat (and now chairman) at the House Financial Services Committee. In subsequent months, Mr. Paulson got the White House to drop its demands for shrinking the companies and focus on toughening oversight, a step he agreed was needed.
In mid-2007, with defaults up and the market for mortgage securities faltering, Mr. Paulson's concerns about housing grew. He asked Robert Steel, then a Treasury undersecretary (and now Wachovia Corp.'s CEO), to canvass experts. Among those called was Lewis Ranieri, who years ago helped pioneer the repackaging of home loans into securities. Treasury officials gathered around a speakerphone as Mr. Ranieri told them the mortgage situation was 'a bit more troubling' than most people realized, says a person familiar with the call.
Mr. Paulson began convening Sunday sessions at his home to focus on housing. As he sat on a couch, often nursing a Diet Coke, staff members arrayed in a semicircle on high-back chairs pitched ideas. They told him there were no easy public-policy options -- that the private sector needed to help financially stressed home buyers.
After Labor Day 2007, Mr. Paulson had his staff get officials of the biggest mortgage players in for meetings. At sessions with lenders, mortgage servicers and nonprofits that counsel troubled borrowers, Mr. Paulson said that foreclosure was in nobody's interest, and industry coordination was vital. Within weeks, he had his senior adviser, Neel Kashkari, now an assistant secretary, inform companies in the mortgage industry he wanted them to form an alliance to work case-by-case with stressed homeowners. On Oct. 10, the Treasury unveiled the alliance, called Hope Now.
In November, with the number of borrowers behind on their payments rising, Mr. Paulson shifted gears. At the Treasury's urging, companies in the alliance agreed to freeze interest rates temporarily on certain troubled loans.
Mr. Paulson demanded monthly updates on foreclosures prevented and loans modified. Some of what he wanted wasn't available, irritating him. He wanted company-specific data, but companies demanded the data be lumped together because they were rivals.
At times, told that a company was rumored to be shirking, Mr. Paulson demanded that an assistant get its CEO on the phone. Staff members persuaded him not to make such calls, arguing that doing so could fracture Hope Now.
Mr. Paulson attended housing town-hall meetings around the country, where he often heard from people fearing for their homes. 'Hank came back from that tour and said things are worse than I thought they were,' says Rep. Frank.
Prices of homes kept sliding, and inventories rising. Investors were shunning securities based on mortgages, having seen some collapse despite top safety ratings. That made Fannie and Freddie even more important, as places where lenders could still sell loans. Without the two government-sponsored enterprises, lending would dry up. But now, they, like banks that invested in mortgage securities, had started reporting sizable losses. Mr. Paulson began suggesting that Fannie and Freddie raise additional capital.
Any illusions the government wouldn't have to get deeply involved in the credit crisis ended in March when Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke arranged for the takeover of Bear Stearns, fearing the uncertain ways a collapse might ripple through markets. But Mr. Paulson, worried the sale to J.P. Morgan Chase would look like a bailout, insisted on a low sale price so Bear Stearns shareholders wouldn't benefit.
Then in June, as home prices showed new declines, investors whipsawed the stocks of Fannie and Freddie. Mr. Paulson heard from his counterparts abroad and from central banks, big holders of Fannie and Freddie debt, wondering what was going on.
He urged his staff to think through what Treasury could do. While some contingency planning existed, staffers began compiling a firmer list of options, from lending the companies money to nationalizing and then reselling them in pieces. Mr. Paulson rejected the nationalization idea, partly because it would make the U.S. responsible for the companies' $1.6 trillion of debt as well as for all the mortgages they guarantee. It became clear the favored route was lending to them or buying equity in them.
Pressure rose on July 7, when a Lehman Brothers analyst speculated an accounting change could force the mortgage giants to raise tens of billions of dollars of new capital. The stocks went into a freefall. Mr. Paulson believed an accounting change wouldn't change the companies' capital situation, but he saw that confidence in them was waning.
On July 10, he decided to call Alan Greenspan for his view. At first, the Treasury couldn't find the former Fed chief's home number. 
Once Mr. Paulson got through, he and several of staff members hunched over a speakerphone, struggling to hear Mr. Greenspan's soft voice. 
They discussed the housing slump's impact on financial firms and whether they had the capital to weather it. (Mr. Greenspan has since said the administration should have recommended the mortgage giants be nationalized, recapitalized, split up and eventually sold to private investors.) By Friday, July 11, Fannie's and Freddie's stocks were down so much Mr. Paulson decided he must act. 'Friday morning it was just clear to me that we didn't want to stress the system, as fragile as it was,' he says. At 7:15 a.m. he briefed President George W. Bush. He began calling members of Congress, asking them to approve a request he would soon make to let the government either invest in Fannie and Freddie or greatly expand their line of credit with the Treasury.
That weekend, as staffers worked out details of the proposal, they camped at the Treasury building, eating sandwiches from the Corner Bakery, the only nearby place open. An agitated Mr. Paulson began circling his staff's offices with questions. Would the markets be reassured? Would the proposal be done in time for the opening of Asian financial markets?
He queried staff members so frequently that before long they had nothing new to tell him. Finally, his chief of staff suggested Mr. Paulson return to his office, telling him that 'you need to leave us alone so we can do our jobs,' according to people familiar with the discussion.
At one point, Mr. Paulson went for a short bike ride to let off steam. As the deadline neared to get the plan in place before Asian markets opened, Mr. Paulson, at his staff's urging, went home to shave and change out of his jeans. At 6 p.m. he appeared on the Treasury's steps, calling for authority that would involve the federal government more deeply than ever before in the nation's financial markets.
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在亨利·鲍尔森(Henry M. Paulson)担任财政部长的第一个月，两位副手曾表示房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)会给经济带来巨大风险。他对此不以为然。当他还在高盛(Goldman Sachs)时，他就向助手表示，这两个抵押贷款巨头不会令他彻夜难眠。
但两年后，它们却真地成了他的头等大事。鲍尔森忙着制定紧急计划，试图拯救这两家公司，避免它们的动荡危及美国经济和世界金融体系。
央行官员&#12289;华尔街人士和国会议员都在观望鲍尔森会有何作为。最初他表示，他无意使用7月份从国会获得的权限向房利美和房地美注入资金。但现在他每天都同主管国内金融的手下举行会议，听他们讨论在必要时应如何进行干预。这些想法包括购买这两家公司的优先股和各种贷款结构。
鲍尔森正在考虑是否对这两家抵押贷款公司一视同仁，是否保留现有管理层，以及对普通股股东和优先股股东的影响，这些股东中包含许多退休基金。其中最令他担忧的一个问题是：大规模注入资金可能最终意味着联邦政府接管这两家公司，包括承担价值数万亿美元的房屋抵押贷款的担保责任。
鲍尔森到财政部就职并不是为了成为干预主义者。他在华尔街时是一位实用主义者，一位撮合交易的人。他关注的不是理想，而是实用手段和达成目标。在加入了信奉放任主义的共和党政府后，鲍尔森帮助推动了联邦政府和金融市场之间关系的转变，这也从侧面反映了信贷危机之深度。
今年3月,他同美国联邦储备委员会(Fed)主席贝南克(Ben Bernanke)一道迫使贝尔斯登接受了摩根大通的收购。早些时候，鲍尔森劝说贷款行冻结了对一些陷入困境的购房者上调利率。财政部也对提供学生贷款承担起了更大的责任，他一直呼吁对监管体系进行变革，赋予Fed更多的权力监督银行和华尔街。
房利美和房地美是他面临的最严峻的考验。这些公司对房屋市场至关重要，它们持有或担保了近一半的美国未偿抵押贷款，总额约为5.2万亿美元，也购买了大部分的新发行贷款。联邦政府对这两大巨头的干预将是美国历史上规模最大&#12289;最复杂的行动之一。
房利美和房地美曾表示，它们的资本金超过了监管部门的最低要求，不需要来自财政部的帮助。尽管鲍尔森有权投资这些公司或购买它们的股份，但两家公司对任何一种做法可能都不情愿。
鲍尔森7月中旬要求获得这种授权，以抚慰市场。但有人认为，这让投资者难以肯定财政部会采取何种行动，或者将如何影响其投资，结果是进一步加剧了房利美和房地美的问题。还有人表示，这种不确定性让这两家公司本已不顺的发售普通股或优先股融资的工作变得更复杂了，尽管它们仍能继续从债市融资。
鲍尔森的做法引起了部分共和党同僚的不满，其中包括白宫的一些人。他们称，联邦政府的支撑只起到了鼓励私营企业重蹈覆辙的作用，他们指责因此可能让纳税人承担过于沉重的救助成本。
阿拉巴马州共和党众议员巴屈斯(Spencer Bachus)说，华尔街有一种在对它们有利的时候寻求政府帮助的倾向。当企业开始亏损时，“政府不需要进入到市场中”的整个理念似乎就变了。
鲍尔森说，他寻求获得授权&#12289;通过帮助房利美和房地美以稳定市场，这并不是为了赢得华尔街什么人的好感。他说，这从感情上来说并不是一件轻松的事情，这不是我来到华盛顿想做的事情。
62岁的鲍尔森2006年7月进入财政部时，他急切希望解决诸如社会保障&#12289;完成全球贸易谈判和要求中国调整某些经济政策等问题。他在华尔街度过了32年，掌管财政部前担任高盛集团的首席执行长，以擅长大刀阔斧达成交易而闻名。尽管拥有约5亿美元的个人财富，鲍尔森却并不炫耀或过于张扬。他有时说话会结结巴巴，或在谈话时下意识地揉肚子或是挠头。
他的风格是埋头于数据和细节之中。他可能会在下达命令后几小时就打电话了解进展。在布什政府中，他果断敢为的做风为他迅速赢得了声誉以及“飓风汉克”(Hurricane Hank)的绰号。
但他不想听信围绕房利美和房地美长期争论的一面之词。批评者称，这两家公司规模太大，如果崩溃将给经济带来风险，而且由于其联邦担保的背景，它们不公平地得到了廉价的融资。政府中的强硬派想要减小这两家公司的规模，加强监管，比如要求它们提高相对较低的资产负债比率。但国会中的许多人和这些公司宽松经营活动的受益者则倾向于更温和的做法。
鲍尔森并不愿意被拖进这场他所称的“圣战”中。2006年9月，一位财政部长助理向记者表示，如果国会不行动，财政部将考虑控制房利美和房地美的途径。马萨诸塞州众议员弗兰克(Barney Frank)则抨击鲍尔森此番表态危害了国会在此问题上取得的进展。
据说，鲍尔森让副手们到他办公室去，然后开始用力拍打咖啡桌的大理石桌面。他大声说，他要跟当时是国会众议院金融服务委员会头号民主党人的弗兰克（现在他是该委员会主席）搞好关系。几个月后，鲍尔森让白宫放弃缩编两家公司的计划，转向采取更严格的监管措施。他认为这是一个必要步骤。
到2007年中，随着信贷违约增多&#12289;按揭证券市场开始动摇,鲍尔森对住房市场的担忧开始加重。他要求时任财政部副部长的罗伯特·斯蒂尔(Robert Steel，现为Wachovia Corp.首席执行长)召集专家，其中包括刘易斯·雷尼利(Lewis Ranieri)，几年前他曾参与住房贷款打包证券化的早期推广工作。
据了解情况的人说，财政部的人围在免提电话旁，听到雷尼利跟他们说，按揭贷款的形势要比大多数人认为的“更麻烦一点”。
从那之后，鲍尔森周日的时候开始在家里召集会议，专门讨论住房问题。他会坐在躺椅上，喝着健怡可乐，手下人坐在高背椅上围成半圆讨论对策。他们告诉他，公共政策方面没有什么轻松的选择，因此，私营领域需要从财务上帮助受困的购房者。
2007年劳工节过后，鲍尔森让下属召集大型按揭机构的人士开会。在与放贷机构&#12289;按揭贷款机构以及为受困借款人提供咨询的非盈利组织讨论后，鲍尔森说，取消住房赎回权对任何人都不利，全行业协调行动非常关键。几周之内，他让他的高级顾问尼尔·卡什卡利(Neel Kashkari，现为助理部长）告知按揭机构，他希望他们组成联盟，与受困的购房者逐一商谈解决办法。10月10日，财政部正式推出这个联盟，起名“Hope Now”。
去年11月，随着还款违约者越来越多，鲍尔森加大了力度，在财政部推动下，参与联盟的公司同意对部分问题贷款暂停上调利率。
鲍尔森要求每月公布取消止赎的数字和调整贷款条款的数字。他要求的有些东西没能实现，对此他很愤怒。他想发布具体到各家公司的数据，但企业界要求数字放在一起公布，因为他们是竞争对手。
有时，当听说市场传言某家公司想逃避的时候，鲍尔森会要求助理联系它的首席执行长。下属劝他不要打这样的电话，因为这样可能会造成“Hope Now”出现裂痕。
鲍尔森在全美各地参加有关房地产市场的公开会议，经常听到人们对住房问题的各种担心。代表弗兰克说：汉克（鲍尔森）从会议回来后说，情况比他想像的还糟。
住房价格持续下滑，待售房屋数量却在增加。投资者对按揭相关证券退避三舍，这类证券即使评级极高，也有一些发生崩盘。这种局面让房利美和房地美的存在显得更重要了，毕竟这里仍能继续发放贷款。如果没有这两家由政府支持的企业，借贷将彻底枯竭。但现在，这两家公司也像有大量按揭投资的银行一样开始传出巨额损失了。鲍尔森开始建议，让它们筹集更多资金。
今年3月，当鲍尔森和贝南克因为担心贝尔斯登(Bear Stearn)倒闭会在市场掀起连锁反应而安排接管该公司的时候，认为政府不会深度卷入信贷危机的幻想随即宣告破产。但鲍尔森担心，让贝尔斯登卖给摩根大通(J.P. Morgan Chase) 看上去像是救助行为，因此他坚持低价出售，这样一来，贝尔斯登股东不会得到多少好处。
6月份，随着房价出现新一波下跌，房利美和房地美股价受到重创。鲍尔森收到外国财政官员和中央银行人士询问到底发生了什么。这些机构都是房利美和房地美债券的大投资者。
鲍尔森督促手下考虑财政部能做些什么。尽管仍有一些应急方案，但下属们还是开始制定更稳健的选择，从给这两家公司提供贷款，到将它们国有化并拆分出售。鲍尔森否决了国有化的想法，部分原因是，这将导致美国要为这两家公司1.6万亿美元的债务及它们担保的全部按揭贷款买单。随着势态逐渐明了，向它们提供贷款或是收购它们部分股权成为比较受欢迎的选择。
到了7月7日，有雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brother)分析师传言，由于会计准则调整，这两家公司可能需要再筹措数百亿美元资本。它们的股价随后直线下跌。鲍尔森认为，会计准则的调整不会改变两公司的资本状况，但他注意到，市场对这两家公司的信心在消退。
7月10日，鲍尔森决定打电话给格林斯潘，听听他的想法。起初，财政部找不到格林斯潘家的电话号码。后来电话打通了，鲍尔森和几个下属挤在免提电话旁希望听到格林斯潘那柔和的声音。
他们讨论了住房市场下滑对金融公司的影响以及他们是否有资本实力经受住这些影响。（格林斯潘一直认为，政府应该建议房利美和房贷美实行国有化&#12289;进行资本重组&#12289;拆分并最终出售给私营机构。到了周五，也就是7月11日，房利美和房贷美股价出现大幅下跌，鲍尔森认为他必须采取行动了。“周五的时候形势已很清楚，整个体系已那么脆弱，我们不能再让它承受压力了，”他说。早晨7点15分，他向布什总统作了简要通报，然后给国会议员们打电话，要求他们同意他即将提出的方案，即让政府要么对两家公司投资，要么大幅提高它们在财政部的信贷额度。
那个周末，财政部工作人员整日都在研究方案的具体细节，他们甚至通宵呆在财政部大楼里，吃的是从附近唯一一家还在开门营业的Corner Bakery买来的三明治。焦虑不安的鲍尔森开始在下属的办公室来回走动，提出这样那样的问题。市场能感到放心吗？方案能否在亚洲金融市场开市前完成？
他不停地问下属问题，很快，他们被问得再也没有什么可以告诉他了。最后，财政部幕僚长建议鲍尔森回自己的办公室。据知情人士说，他告诉鲍尔森：你别打扰我们，这样我们才能做事。
其间，鲍尔森还骑了一会自行车以便放松一下。时间一点点过去，亚洲市场开盘时间越来越近，他们也到了最后截止的时候，下属劝鲍尔森回家洗漱，换下牛仔裤。下午6点，鲍尔森出现在财政部大楼外的台阶上，呼吁包括联邦政府在内的有关部门更多地参与到这个国家的金融市场中去。
